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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

New York Court of Appeals upholds searchof outer surface of public high school student's book bag based on less than reasonable
suspicion
Students, as United States citizens, are guaranteed under the
Fourth Amendment 1 protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.' Traditionally, however, courts have limited this Fourth
Amendment protection within the school environment.3
New
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: 'Mhe right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... "
2 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985) (indicating that searches of
students by public school officials are governed by Fourth Amendment). The Court in
T.L.O. determined that students have "legitimate expectations of privacy" in personal
property brought to school and that "schoolchildren may find it necessary to carry
with them a variety of legitimate, noncontraband items." Id. at 338-39. New York
courts have long recognized that students enjoy some protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. See, e.g., People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 485, 315 N.E.2d
466, 467, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (1974) ("High school students are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, even in the school, by employees of the State
whether they be police officers or school teachers."); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d
909, 910, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1971) (holding that students retain limited Fourth Amendment rights in school setting), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d
734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972); People v. Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d 697, 698,
356 N.Y.S.2d 432,434 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't 1974) (arguing Tinker doctrine that
schoolchildren "do not shed their constitutional rights 'at the school house gate"
should apply to Fourth Amendment as well as First Amendment rights) (quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
3 See, e.g., Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d at 488, 315 N.E.2d at 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 408
(requiring less cause for school search than for search conducted outside of school);
People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360, 363, 229 N.E.2d 596, 598, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25
(1967) (holding that vice principal had power to consent to search of student's locker
due to school's control over locker and its duty to supervise students), aff'd on rehg,
24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969); see also In re Ronald B., 61
A.D.2d 204, 206-07, 401 N.Y.S.2d 544, 546 (2d Dep't 1978) (upholding frisk of student
based upon reasonable suspicion); Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d at 914, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736
(upholding school search based upon reasonable suspicion short of probable cause).
In providing less Fourth Amendment protection within the school setting, earlier
New York cases relied primarily on the doctrine of in loco parentis,which posits that
teachers are not subject to constitutional limitations since they stand in the place of
parents. See generally 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 493 (1952) ("A school
teacher stands in the place of a parent to pupils, and may exercise such powers of
control, restraint, and correction as may be reasonably necessary to enable him to
perform his duties as teacher and accomplish the purposes of education."). In Overton,
the court of appeals reasoned that school authorities have an obligation to maintain
safety in schools, and that parents have a right to expect that protective measures
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York courts have long recognized that warrantless searches of students are reasonable, even without probable cause,4 so long as
will be taken. 20 N.Y.2d at 362, 229 N.E.2d at 597, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 24. The Jackson
court expressed a similar idea: "[Tlhe in loco parentisdoctrine is so compelling in light
of public necessity and as a social concept antedating the Fourth Amendment, that
any action, including a search, taken thereunder upon reasonable suspicion should be
accepted as necessary and reasonable." 65 Misc. 2d at 913, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736. Citing Overton, the court recognized "the affirmative obligation [of school officials] to
investigate any charge that a student is using or possessing narcotics,' which 'becomes a duty when suspicion arises.'" Id. at 910, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 733 (citation
omitted).
Unlike some states, see T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 n.2, New York has not found that
the doctrine of in loco parentis leaves teachers and other school officials totally free
from Fourth Amendment constraints, but has consistently recognized limits to the in
loco parentisdoctrine in the context of Fourth Amendment rights. See supra note 2;
Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d at 699-700, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (holding doctrine inapplicable to
search of student performed by school security officer who was not considered member
of school's professional staff).
In Scott D., the New York Court ofAppeals based its determination that students
receive less Fourth Amendment protection upon the widespread dangers in schools as
well as upon the parental role of teachers. 34 N.Y.2d at 486-88, 315 N.E.2d at 469-70,
358 N.Y.S.2d at 406, 408. The court recognized that "the conditions of security in a
school may not be ignored and will modify the rules for the application of the standard
of reasonableness for a school search." Id. at 488, 315 N.E.2d at 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d at
408. The court also observed, however, that school searches often lead to criminal
prosecutions, thus attenuating the similarity between school officials and parents and
highlighting the student's need for Fourth Amendment safeguards in the school setting. Id. at 488, 315 N.E.2d at 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 407-08.
Outside the school environment, students are entitled to the same Fourth
Amendment rights as adults. See Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d at 488, 315 N.E.2d at 469, 358
N.Y.S.2d at 408. Ordinarily, courts prefer that searches be performed pursuant to a
search warrant. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Even if a search falls within
a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, it is usually justified only where
probable cause exists. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (citations omitted). As the T.L.O.
court noted, however, "'probable cause' is not an irreducible requirement of a valid
search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and
seizures be reasonable ... ." Id. at 340 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
4 See, e.g., Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d at 913, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736 (concluding that "the
rigid standard, probable cause, may not be imposed upon a school official if he is expected to act effectively in loco parentis"). The court in Jackson reasoned that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonablesearches and seizures, and that reasonableness depends upon the context in which the search is conducted. Id. at 913,
319 N.Y.S.2d at 735. To illustrate the impact of context upon the reasonableness of
the search, the court drew an analogy to Terry, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
reduced the level of cause required for a limited weapons patdown due to the need to
ensure safety and the limited intrusion of weapons frisks. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S.
at 27). In Scott D., the court of appeals likewise considered the "ultimate issue" to
involve the balancing of individual rights against the urgent needs of society. 34
N.Y.2d at 488, 315 N.E.2d at 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 408. "Given the special responsibility of school teachers in the control of the school precincts and the grave threat, even
lethal threat, of drug abuse among school children, the basis for finding sufficient
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there existed sufficient individualized suspicion that evidence of a
violation of law or of school rules would be found.5 In 1985, the
United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 6 adopted a
similar standard, stating that "the legality of a search of a student
should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search."7 Thus, a school official need not obtain
cause for a school search will be less than that required outside the school precincts."
Id.; see also Ronald B., 61 A.D.2d at 206, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (interpreting Scott D. to
require that school searches be reasonable, although not necessarily based upon probable cause).
5 While probable cause clearly is not required, New York courts have struggled to
define the level of suspicion necessary to search a student. In Jackson, the Appellate
Term, First Department, required that a school search "have a basis founded at least
upon reasonable grounds for suspecting that something unlawful is being committed,
or about to be committed. . . ." 65 Misc. 2d at 914, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 736. Prior to
T.L.O., however, the court of appeals did not use "reasonable grounds" language to
describe the appropriate level of suspicion. For example, in Scott D. the court struck
down a school search, indicating that the suspicions of the official performing the
search lacked a "sufficient basis." 34 N.Y.2d at 490, 315 N.E.2d at 470, 358 N.Y.S.2d
at 409. While the court made clear that "random causeless searches" are impermissible, it suggested that the search may have been reasonable if it were based on "More
than an equivocal suspicion that [the student] is engaged in dangerous activities." Id.
at 489, 315 N.E.2d at 470, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 408. Factors to be considered in assessing
whether there was sufficient cause to search include the age and history of the student, the prevalence of the suspected infraction at the particular school, and any exigency involved. Id. The following year in People v. Singletary, 37 N.Y.2d 310, 311,
333 N.E.2d 369, 370, 372 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (1975), the court of appeals again refrained
from labeling the quantum of suspicion required as "reasonable grounds" or "reasonable suspicion" when it upheld the search of a student based upon "concrete, articulable facts" from a known informant. Id.
6 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
7 Id. at 341. To be reasonable, the search must be 'justified at its inception" and
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place." Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). The T.L.O. Court stated that
[u]nder ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other
school official will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.
Id. at 341-42 (footnotes omitted). T.L.O. involved the search of a high school student's
purse by the school's assistant vice principal, which was conducted after a teacher
discovered the student smoking in the restroom in violation of school regulations. Id.
at 328. When the student denied smoking, the assistant vice principal demanded to
see her purse, opened it, and found a package of cigarettes. Id. Upon removing the
cigarettes, he saw a package of cigarette rolling papers, which indicated possible drug
use. Id. This evidence triggered a complete search of the purse, which produced marijuana and evidence of drug dealing. Id.
The T.L.O. Court stated that the scope of the search as performed must be "reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of
the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." Id. at 342 (footnote
omitted). The search of the student's purse, which included opening a zippered com-
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a search warrant before searching a student at school,' nor is
probable cause required.9 While the T.L.O. Court held that ordinarily a school search will be reasonable when based upon "reasonable grounds" or "reasonable suspicion,"' ° the Court did not
rule that this level of justification is always required for a school
search to be constitutionally permissible. 1 ' Recently, in In re
partment and reading letters found in the purse, was held to be reasonable in scope.
Id. at 347.
8 Id. at 340. In holding that a search warrant is not required, the U.S. Supreme
Court reasoned that requiring a warrant would unduly burden the ability of teachers
to maintain discipline. Id.
9 Id. at 341. The Court also found the probable cause standard too demanding for
the school setting. Id.
10 The inconsistent conclusions regarding what constitutes reasonable suspicion
based on the same facts reached by the New Jersey courts and U.S. Supreme Court in
T.L.O., see 469 U.S. at 344-46, and by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Gregory
M., 82 N.Y.2d 588, 591, 627 N.E.2d 500, 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d 579, 580 (1993), indicate
that this requirement is somewhat elusive.
11 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42. Several other issues pertaining to school searches
were expressly left open by the T.L.O. Court. While the Court fashioned its holding to
apply to searches by public school officials, it declined to consider the question of the
level of suspicion required when school officials perform searches in connection with
or when urged by law enforcement officials. See id. at 341 n.7. Compare People v.
Bowers, 77 Misc. 2d 697, 699-70, 356 N.Y.S.2d 432, 435 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't
1974) (finding that probable cause, rather than less demanding standard, governed
legality of search performed by school security officer because officer, although paid by
Board of Education, had been appointed by Police Commissioner and remained subject to commissioner's orders and was, therefore, government agent) with People v.
Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 910, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1971)
(upholding off-premises search conducted by coordinator of discipline pursuant to
chase initiated at school and based upon "a high degree of suspicion, but short of
probable cause," despite follow-up assistance of police officer patrolling school), aff'd,
30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972).
In T.L.O., the U.S. Supreme Court also left unresolved the question of whether
the exclusion of evidence is the appropriate remedy for violations of students' Fourth
Amendment rights. See 469 U.S. at 333 n.3. In People v. Scott D., the New York Court
of Appeals held that the exclusionary rule does apply to searches of students. 34
N.Y.2d 483,488, 315 N.E.2d 466, 469, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403, 408 (1974). The T.L.O. Court
also declined to resolve the issue of locker searches, 469 U.S. at 337-38 n.5, but the
New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue in People v. Overton, 20 N.Y.2d 360,
229 N.E.2d 596, 283 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). See supra note 3. The T.L.O. Court expressly
left open the issue of whether individualized suspicion is always necessary for school
searches, although it noted that prior cases have upheld searches without individualized suspicion when the official's discretion is limited and the search implicates minimal privacy interests. 469 U.S. at 342 n.8. In People v. Dukes, 151 Misc. 2d 295, 300,
580 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1992), the court upheld the use
of a metal detector at the entrance of a Manhattan public high school as a reasonable
administrative search, despite the lack of suspicion concerning particular individuals.
The court found the search to be minimally intrusive, due to school guidelines that
limited the extent of the search and required that the device be activated twice before
a limited patdown for weapons could be performed. Id. at 299, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
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Gregory M., 2 the New York Court of Appeals upheld a patdown
search of the exterior of a high school student's book bag by a
school security officer; the search was initiated on grounds that
13
concededly did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.
In Gregory M., a student arrived at his Bronx high school
without his identification card and went to the dean's office to obtain a new one. 14 School policy required that he leave his cloth
book bag with a school security officer. 1 5 When the student tossed
his bag onto a metal shelf, the contact produced a "metallic 'thud'"
which the security officer described as "'unusual.' ""6 Alerted by
the sound, the security officer touched the outside of the book bag
and detected the shape of a gun." He then called the school's
dean, who also felt the form of a gun within the bag.-8 Upon opening the bag, the head of security discovered a .38 Titan Tiger Special located inside.' 9
At the subsequent juvenile delinquency proceeding, the Family Court, Bronx County, denied Gregory M.'s motion to suppress
the gun.2 ° On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the Family
Court's ruling, finding that the metallic thud heard by the security
officer gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that a gun was located
in the student's book bag, thereby justifying the patdown search,
or "frisk," of the bag's exterior. 2 '
In a six-to-one decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
holdings of the lower courts.2 2 After recognizing that searches of
public school students are subject to constitutional limitations,2 3
When balanced against the strong governmental interest in weapon-free schools, the
slight invasion of privacy was reasonable. Id. at 300, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
12 82 N.Y.2d 588, 627 N.E.2d 500, 606 N.Y.S.2d 579 (1993).
13 Id. at 591, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
14

Id.

15 Id. at 590, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
16 Id. The security officer's action consisted of "[running] his fingers over the
outer surface of the bottom of the bag." Id.
17 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 590, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20

Id. at 590-91, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.

21 Id. at 591, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580. The Appellate Division,
First Department, reversed the Family Court's determination ofjuvenile delinquency
and remanded the matter for fact-finding on an evidentiary issue unrelated to the
touching of Gregory M.'s book bag. Id.
22 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 591, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
23 Id. at 591-92, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581; see also supra note 3 and
accompanying text (describing limitations of students' constitutional rights while on
school grounds).
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Judge Levine, writing for the majority, applied the balancing of
interests analysis employed in People v. Scott D.1 4 and T.L.O. to
determine whether the search at issue was reasonable despite the
absence of reasonable suspicion. 25 This balancing entails weighing the student's "legitimate expectations of privacy and personal
27
security"26 against the government's need to maintain order.
Judge Levine acknowledged that the T.L.O. Court required less
justification for school searches than for searches outside the
school setting and that ordinarily school searches may be performed upon reasonable grounds for suspecting that a violation of
law or school rules has been committed.28 The court accepted
T.L.O.'s reasonable suspicion standard as applicable under the
New York Constitution 29 searches of students and their belongings when such searches resemble the one performed in T.L.0.,3 °
but distinguished the search of the student's purse in T.L.O. from
the "investigative touching" of Gregory M.'s book bag." In the
24 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974).
25 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 592-94, 627 N.E.2d at 502-03, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 58182. The court acknowledged that the "minimally intrusive," "purposeful investigative
touching" of the cloth book bag fell "marginally within a search for constitutional purposes." Id. at 591, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (citations omitted). The
court then conceded that the sound made when the student tossed his bag, without
more, did not create a reasonable suspicion that the bag contained a weapon. Id.
26 Id. at 592, 627 N.E.2d at 502, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581. The New York Court of
Appeals stated that:
[T]he Supreme Court held that a determination of the appropriate standard
of reasonableness to govern a certain class of searches requires a balancing:
"On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need
for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order."
Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985)).
27 Id.
28 Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342).
29 N.Y. CONST. art. I,

§ 12.

30 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 592, 627 N.E.2d at 502, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581.

31 Id. at 592-93, 627 N.E.2d at 502, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581. The court stated that
"the investigative touching of the outer surface of appellant's book bag falls within a
class of searches far less intrusive than those which, under New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
require application of the reasonable suspicion standard." Id. at 592, 627 N.E.2d at
502, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581. In justifying its use of a standard below reasonable suspicion, the court noted that the T.L.O. Court did not mandate that a certain level of
individualized suspicion always be required. Id. at 593, 627 N.E.2d at 502, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 581-82 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8). Notably, the Gregory M. court
did not rely on the doctrine of in loco parentis in applying a lesser standard of suspicion, but instead alluded to the special needs doctrine. See 82 N.Y.2d at 592, 627
N.E.2d at 503, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 582; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (reasoning that warrant and probable cause requirements should be lifted
only when "special needs" render adherence to those standards impracticable). The
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court's view, when Gregory M. relinquished his book bag to the
security guard as required by school policy, he "had only a minimal expectation of privacy" in the guard's touching the exterior of
the bag.32 The court reasoned that Gregory M.'s diminished privacy interests were clearly outweighed by the urgent governmental interest in keeping deadly weapons out of schools, rendering
appropriate a standard below that of reasonable suspicion.33
Thus, the "'unusual' metallic thud" was sufficient to render the
investigative touching reasonable and not arbitrary, even though
it did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the bag contained a firearm. 34 The court conditioned its use of a "graduated
standard of reasonableness" on the limited nature of the search
and the fact that its purpose was to maintain security
in the
35
school rather than to investigate criminal activity.
In a vehement dissent, Judge Titone criticized the majority
for providing students less Fourth Amendment protection than
the "reasonable suspicion" standard used by the Supreme Court in
T.L. 0.36 According to Judge Titone, the touching of the bag's exterior constituted a "full-blown search" requiring reasonable suspicion even in the school setting under T.L.O. 3 7 He reasoned that
T.L.O. provided no basis for the court to uphold such a search on
less than reasonable suspicion3 8 and found the court's description
of the "'investigative touching'" of the bag's exterior as "'far less
intrusive' than other types of searches" to be inconsistent with recent court of appeals decisions. 9 Judge Titone objected to the
T.L.O. majority had discounted the in locoparentisdoctrine as inconsistent with modern views and found that school authorities instead derive their power from the state.
Id. at 336-37.
32 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 593, 627 N.E.2d at 502, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
33 Id. at 593, 627 N.E.2d at 502-03, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82.
34 Id. at 593-94, 627 N.E.2d at 503, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 582. When the guard discerned the shape of a gun, there arose reasonable suspicion to support the subsequent
opening of the bag. Id. at 594, 627 N.E.2d at 503, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
35 Id.
36 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 596, 627 N.E.2d at 504-05, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 583
(Titone, J., dissenting).
37 Id. (Titone, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 596, 627 N.E.2d at 504-05, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (Titone, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 597, 627 N.E.2d at 505, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (Titone, J., dissenting).
Judge Titone referred to People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d
940 (1993), andInre Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d 942,613 N.E.2d 568,597 N.Y.S.2d 662
(1993), emphasizing the manual manipulation involved in an investigative touching.
Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 597, 627 N.E.2d at 505, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (Titone, J.,
dissenting). In Diaz, the court of appeals declined to extend the plain view doctrinewhich provides that finding items located in "plain view" is not a search subject to the
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court's classification of the touching as a "minimally intrusive"4 °
type of search that justified a lesser standard of suspicion, arguing
that, once particular conduct has been found to constitute a full
search, rather than a less intrusive investigation such as the limited weapons patdown at issue in Terry v. Ohio,4 1 courts have
been unwilling to reduce the level of suspicion required based
merely on the intrusiveness of a particular search.4 2 Further, the
characterization of the touching as a full search rather than a limited patdown depends upon the intrusiveness of the touching, and
should not be affected by the fact that the search occurred within
the school context.4" Judge Titone noted that the T.L.O. Court
recognized that students retain privacy interests in the school environment. 4 ' In addition, Judge Titone doubted that the prevalence of weapons in schools justified the majority's holding because the court did not tailor the applicability of a lesser standard
to crimes involving dangerous weapons, and there are more effective means of curbing the problem, such as metal detectors.4 5 Finally, Judge Titone perceived potential difficulties in applying the

limits of the Fourth Amendment-to the detection of other contraband items during a
limited weapons frisk. 81 N.Y.2d at 107, 612 N.E.2d at 299, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 941. The
court of appeals in Marrhonda G. likewise held the "plain touch" doctrine inapplicable
to an officer's inadvertent detection of the form of a gun in a suspected runaway's bag.
81 N.Y.2d at 944-45, 613 N.E.2d at 569, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 663. But see Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2136-38 (1993) (accepting plain touch doctrine within
bounds marked by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
40 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 591, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
41 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a patdown search
for weapons based upon reasonable suspicion. Id. at 30-31.
42 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 597, 627 N.E.2d at 505, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (Titone,
J., dissenting). According to Judge Titone, the majority thereby "blur[red] the all-important distinction between searches and such lesser forms of intrusion as limited
Terry patdowns." Id.
43 Id. at 598, 627 N.E.2d at 506, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (Titone, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 598-99, 627 N.E.2d at 506, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (Titone, J., dissenting).
Judge Titone observed that the school setting does not diminish the invasiveness of
the search and reminded the court that students' privacy interests in belongings
brought to school have been recognized. Id. at 599, 627 N.E.2d at 506, 606 N.Y.S.2d at
585. He also noted that, in this case, it cannot be said that Gregory M. waived his
right to privacy because he was required to leave his closed book bag with the security
officer temporarily in order to obtain identification. Id.
45 Id. at 599-600, 627 N.E.2d at 506-07, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 586 (Titone, J., dissenting). Judge Titone stressed that, despite varying governmental needs, constitutional
protections should be viewed as constant. Id. at 600, 627 N.E.2d at 507, 606 N.Y.S.2d
at 586.
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majority's holding, since the court did not indicate the nature or
limits of the standard it used.4
It is submitted that while the court of appeals in Gregory M.
reached the correct result in the case before it, the application of a
standard lower than reasonable suspicion for initiating a school
search should be viewed as the exception, rather than the rule.
The T.L.O. Court did not expressly mandate that reasonable suspicion be regarded as the absolute minimum basis for a school
search.4 7 Rather, in balancing the interests involved, the Court
focused on the overall reasonableness of the search under the circumstances. 48 In light of the factual distinctions between T.L.O.
and Gregory M., the court of appeals was justified in departing
from the reasonable suspicion standard to determine the legality
of the investigation of Gregory M.'s bag. While the search at issue
in T.L.O. involved the opening of a student's purse to look for ciga46 Id. at 601-02, 627 N.E.2d at 507-08, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (Titone, J., dissenting). Judge Titone alluded to the lack of guidance provided by the court, since the
distinction between reasonable suspicion and a "thud'" which "'evidently suggest[ed] to the school security officer the possibility that [the bag] might contain a
weapon'" is a fine one. Id. at 601, 627 N.E.2d at 507, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (Titone, J.,
dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, 82 N.Y.2d at 593, 627 N.E.2d at 503, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 582). According to Judge Titone, the majority's description of the level of
suspicion justitring the touching of Gregory M.'s bag as "an 'evident suggestion!" and
"a 'premonition' that is 'less rigorous' than reasonable suspicion" is unlikely to provide
any meaningful guidance to school authorities. Id. at 601, 627 N.E.2d at 507-08, 606
N.Y.S.2d at 587 (Titone, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, 82 N.Y.2d at
591, 593, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 503, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580, 582). Judge Titone also expressed concern that the court's standard might condone arbitrary, causeless
searches based merely upon "unusual" behavior. Id. at 601-602, 627 N.E.2d at 508,
606 N.Y.S.2d at 587 (Titone, J., dissenting).
47 The T.L.O. Court stated that a school official's search of a student will be properly instituted upon reasonable grounds "[u]nder ordinary circumstances." New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985). It is not clear whether the footnote that
follows this sentence, reserving the question of whether individualized suspicion is
needed in all types of school searches, id. at 342 n.8, conditions the "ordinary circumstances" language such that the level of individualized suspicion may not be reduced,
or whether it refers to the requirement of suspicion pertaining to a particular
individual.
48 Id. at 341. Notably, the Court began its analysis by quoting the reasonableness
standard adopted in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), which "requires
'balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.'" T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 337 (quoting Camara,387 U.S. at 536-37). This test was used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to determine whether stops and
patdowns, which are deemed lesser intrusions than full arrests and searches, see 3
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 9.1(c), at 339-40 (2d ed. 1978), may be justified upon a lesser showing than probable
cause. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
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rettes, 49 the search in Gregory M. involved the significantly lesser
invasion of touching the outside of a book bag to determine if it
contained a firearm.50 Also, it is clear that the governmental interest in maintaining public safety at issue in Gregory M. is much
more compelling than the suspected infraction involved in T.L. 0.,
tipping the scales in favor of reasonableness. It is submitted that
to remain true to T.L.O., however, the court of appeals should
have emphasized that reasonable suspicion is the baseline standard of cause required for a school search, and the use of a less
demanding standard is the exception, just as probable cause is the
norm and reasonable suspicion the exception outside the school
setting. 51

The prevalence of weapons in schools is on the rise,52 presenting lethal dangers to students, staff, and the community at large.
In instances involving deadly weapons, school officials should be
accorded the flexibility contemplated by the T.L.O. Court.5 As
49 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
50 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 590-91, 627 N.E.2d at 501, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
51 As a leading commentator has observed, "[tihe balancing test makes more
sense if it is viewed not so much as a matter for case-by-case application, but rather
as a technique for establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain distinct
kinds of official action." LAFAvE, supra note 48, § 9.1(d), at 344. It is submitted that
limiting the Gregory M. holding to factually similar cases will alleviate Judge Titone's
concern that the court would engage in its own balancing in every search case. See
Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 599, 627 N.E.2d at 506, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 585-86 (1993)
(Titone, J., dissenting) (noting that balance was "carefully and deliberately struck in
T.L.O. by permitting searches conducted without warrants and on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause") (citation omitted). See generally LAFAVE, supra note
48, § 3.2(a), at 557-66.
52 See Maria Newman, Disciplinary Schools Planned for Students Carrying
Weapons, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al (noting increase in school violence in recent
years). The New York City's Schools Chancellor is seeking approval from the Board of
Education to initiate a program that would impose one-year suspensions upon students who are found carrying guns or other weapons, during which time the students
would be required to attend disciplinary schools. Id.
53 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343. In addition to its emphasis on the overall reasonableness of the search, the Court defined the reasonable suspicion standard flexibly.
The Court stated that reasonable suspicion is not merely an "'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch,"'" 469 U.S. at 346 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27 (1968)), but it went on to find that the standard entails "the sort of'common-sense
conclusio[n] about human behavior' upon which 'practical people'-including government officials-are entitled to rely," 469 U.S. at 346 (quoting U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411, 418 (1981)) (alteration in original). The fact that the T.L.O. Court did not refer to
Terry's requirement of"specific and articulable facts," Terry, 392 U.S at 21, as well as
the T.L.O. Court's description of the lower court's conclusion that reasonable suspicion did not exist as "crabbed," 469 U.S. at 343, may indicate that the Court approved
a looser standard for reasonable suspicion in the school context. Furthermore, the
T.L.O. Court did not require "absolute certainty," 469 U.S. at 346, and indicated that
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Judge Titone observed in his dissent, however, the court of appeals in Gregory M. did not tailor its holding to accommodate the
unique risks of weapons 54 and provided little guidance to those
who will be performing or evaluating school searches. 55 Perhaps
the court's focus on the limited intrusion and scope of the search
at issue will help rein in its departure from the reasonable suspicion standard.56
CatherineM. Dugan

innocent explanations for the acts forming the basis of the school official's suspicions
do not preclude the existence of reasonable suspicion, 469 U.S. at 345, 346.
54 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 599-600, 627 N.E.2d at 506-07, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 586
(Titone, J., dissenting). The New York Court of Appeals' recent rejection of the plain
touch doctrine in Diaz and MarrhondaG. may help define these limits, since items of
contraband other than weapons discovered in a patdown search similar to the one in
Gregory M. are likely to be suppressed in light of those cases. See supra note 39.
55 Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d at 601, 627 N.E.2d at 507-08, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
56 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1968). The Court suggested that "limitations upon the scope of searches in individual cases" might serve "as a potential mode
of regulation." Id. at 18 n.15.

